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1. Introduction: Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism, and Internalism 
In metaethics, there is a long and persistent debate about the 
nature of judgments about what is morally right or wrong1. Ac-
cording to Moral Cognitivism, a moral judgment consists in a be-
lief or proposition, whereas according to Moral Non-Cognitivism 
it consists in a non-cognitive state, such as an emotion or a de-
sire. The debate is essential to our understanding of the nature 
of morality in that it concerns whether moral judgments pur-
port to say something about the world – that actions have mor-
al properties which can make these judgments true or false — 
or report our attitudes towards these actions2. 
In metaaesthetics — the analogue to metaethics — there is 
a corresponding tradition of debating the nature of judgments 
about what is aesthetically good or bad3. This debate is often 
pursued from a more historical perspective than what cus-
                                                            
1 I will refer to these judgments as “moral judgments”. 
2 For an overview of the debate between Moral Cognitivism and Non-
Cognitivism, see e.g. Miller 2013. In metaethics, it is often presumed that if 
Non-Cognitivism is correct about morality, the same applies to aesthetics. 
See Ayer 1952: 103 for an early expression of this assumption. For criticism, 
see Kivy 1980: 351-65. 
3 I will refer to these judgments as “aesthetic judgments” and use “valuable” 
as synonymous for “good”. For an overview of theories about aesthetic 
value, see Dickie 1984. 
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tomarily is the case in metaethics4. However, recently a less 
historically oriented discussion about the plausibility of Cogni-
tivism and Non-Cognitivism with regard to aesthetic judg-
ments has commenced.  
According to both Aesthetic Cognitivism and Non-Cogniti-
vism, a sentence of the type “Parsifal is aesthetically valuable” 
expresses, by virtue of its sematic meaning, an aesthetic 
judgment. However, they differ as to what such a judgment 
consists in. On Cognitivism, it consists in an ordinary proposi-
tion or belief according to which the object in question has the 
property of being aesthetically valuable, with the result that 
the judgment can be true or false. On Non-Cognitivism, it con-
sists in a non-cognitive state with regard to the work in ques-
tion, with the consequence that it cannot be true or false5. 
Like the debate in metaethics, the conflict concerns whether 
aesthetic judgments aim to say something about the world —
                                                            
4 Especially, much of the discussion is concerned with response-dependent 
models with origin in Hume. Needless to say, this tradition is very rich and 
displays a variety of highly diverse views. See e.g. Budd 1995: Ch. 1; 
Goldman 1995: esp. Ch. 2; Taliaferro 1990: 1-13; Levinson 2002: 227-38; 
Ross 2008: 20-8. Cf. Pettit 1983: 18-38. For two important but widely 
different non-reductionist alternatives, see McDowell 1983: 1-16, and 
Railton 1998: 59-105. For forceful criticism of this type of model, see 
Schellekens 2006: 163-77, and Kieran 2008: 278-94. For a defence of 
aesthetic realism, see Zemach 1997. 
5 Recently, some authors have considered the plausibility of Aesthetic Non-
Cognitivism; see Hopkins 2001: 166-89; Todd 2004: 277-96. For criticism, 
see McGonigal 2006: 331-48. Thus far, the scope of the discussion has been 
rather narrow. First, it concerns the plausibility of a particular version of 
Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism inspired by Simon Blackburn’s metaethical quasi-
realism (see e.g. Blackburn 1993). Second, it concerns whether this view can 
explain the autonomy of aesthetic judgments and, in relation to this, the 
nature of disagreement about aesthetic evaluations. For more general 
discussions about Aesthetic Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism, see e.g. Pettit 
1983: 18; Strandberg 2011b: 51-67, and Archer 2013: 67-84. For a general 
criticism of Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism, see Zemach 1997: Ch. 1. 
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whether art works and other objects have aesthetic value 
properties that make these judgments true or false — or 
whether they merely constitute our attitudes towards these 
objects. Similarly, which view turns out to be correct has sig-
nificant implications as regards the nature of aesthetics: 
whether there are any aesthetic value properties; whether we 
can attain aesthetic knowledge; whether aesthetics is “objec-
tive” or “subjective”, whether it is “absolute” or “relative”, etc. 
The most significant argument against Moral Cognitivism 
and for Moral Non-Cognitivism is founded on Moral Internal-
ism, which states that there is a conceptually necessary con-
nection between moral judgments and motivation. It is there-
fore pertinent to investigate whether Aesthetic Internalism, 
which makes the corresponding claim about aesthetic judg-
ments, is plausible. In this paper, I develop two lines of argu-
ments. First, I argue that it is difficult to identify any viable ver-
sion of Aesthetic Internalism. As a result, the prime argument 
against Aesthetic Cognitivism, and for Aesthetic Non-Cogniti-
vism, is flawed and the latter view probably incorrect. Second, 
I argue that considerations about Aesthetic Internalism give 
rise to two normative puzzles concerning the connection be-
tween aesthetic judgments, normative judgments, rationality 
and motivation. It is suggested that in order to solve these two 
puzzles, we are forced to revise the established view about 
normative judgments. Thus, surprisingly, it turns out that con-
siderations in metaaesthetics have significant implications for 
the normative domain in general. Finally, the solution to the 
two puzzles suggests a novel externalist account of aesthetic 
judgments. 
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2. Generic Aesthetic Internalism 
Consider the following moral case. 
 
Case 1. You are involved in a conversation with a couple of Americans 
about people’s moral responsibilities as citizens. The discussion 
concerns which candidate it would be morally right or wrong to vote 
for in the presidential election in the U.S. One of them utters “Voting 
for Hillary Clinton is what is morally right. That’s what one absolutely 
should do”. However, she has no motivation whatsoever to vote for 
Clinton. Indeed, later it turns out that she votes for Donald Trump. 
 
Employing our linguistic intuitions, we are likely to find the 
person’s utterance puzzling in view of her lacking motivation. 
If a person utters a moral sentence, we strongly presume that 
she is accordingly motivated. In case she is not, we look for an 
explanation. We might come to suspect that she is not sincere 
or perhaps that she uses “wrong” in another way than we do. 
Indeed, it might even be suggested that we would not ascribe 
a moral judgment to her since she lacks the relevant motiva-
tion. Cases of this type are assumed to give support to “Moral 
Internalism”6. A generic version of this view can be formulated 
thus as follows. 
 
Generic Moral Internalism: there is some conceptually necessary, 
non-trivial, connection between a person’s moral judgment and her 
motivation to act7.  
 
                                                            
6 I use “Moral Internalism” and “Aesthetic Internalism” when not referring to 
any particular version of these views. 
7 All occurrences of “necessary” in this paper refer to conceptual necessity. 
An overview of various version of Moral Internalism can be found in 
Björnsson et al 2014: 1-20. 
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Now, consider the following aesthetic case. 
 
Case 2. You are involved in a conversation with a group of people about 
classical music. The discussion concerns the aesthetic value of different 
operas. One of them utters “Wagner’s Parsifal is absolutely amazing. 
His best I would say”. However, it turns out that she has no 
motivation whatsoever to listen to Parsifal or even a single part of 
this opera. Indeed, later in turns out that she prefers musicals like 
The Lion King. 
 
It appears that our linguistic intuitions support a correspond-
ing characterization of this case. We would presumably be 
puzzled by the person’s utterance considering her lacking mo-
tivation. If a person utters that an object is aesthetically valua-
ble, we strongly presume that she is motivated to see it, listen 
to it, read it, etc. In case she is not, we want an explanation 
(Archer 2013: 71; King unpublished). We might even come to 
suspect that she is not sincere or does not use the relevant 
term in the same way we do in an aesthetic context. It might 
even be suggested that we do not ascribe an aesthetic judg-
ment to a person unless she has the relevant motivation. This 
line of thought might be taken to provide support for “Aes-
thetic Internalism”8. A generic version of this view is the fol-
lowing. 
 
Generic Aesthetics Internalism: there is some conceptually neces-
sary, non-trivial, connection between a person’s aesthetic judgment 
and her motivation to act. 
                                                            
8 Aesthetic Internalism is underdiscussed in the literature, but see Sinnott-
Armstrong 2010: 71-86; Strandberg 2011b: 51-67; Archer 2013: 67-84, and 
King unpublished. 
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The rejection of either form of Internalism might be called 
“Moral Externalism” and “Aesthetic Externalism”, respectively. 
 
3. Strong Aesthetic Internalism 
The strongest version of Moral Internalism proposed in the lit-
erature can be formulated as follows. Strong Moral Internal-
ism: necessarily, if a person S judges that it is morally right that 
she performs an action, then she is at least somewhat moti-
vated to perform it. 
This view finds support in thought experiments like Case 1. 
As noted above, a possible response to this case is that the 
person who utters “Voting for Hillary Clinton is what is morally 
right”, without being motivated at all to do so, does not really 
think that it is right to vote for Clinton. This version of Internal-
ism in conjunction with the so-called Humean theory of moti-
vation is thought to entail that Cognitivism is false and to pro-
vide an argument for Non-Cognitivism: 
 
(1) Strong Moral Internalism: necessarily, if a person S judges 
that it is morally right that she performs an action, then she is 
at least somewhat motivated to perform it. 
(2) Humean Theory of Motivation: a person S having a belief is 
not sufficient for her to be motivated. In order to be motivat-
ed, she needs to have a non-cognitive state in the form of a 
desire. 
(C) Moral Cognitivism is false: a person S’s moral judgment 
does not consist in a belief. A moral judgment at least partly 
consists in a non-cognitive state. 
 
The explanation why (C) follows from (1) and (2) is assumed to 
be the following: (1) entails that a person making a moral 
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judgment is sufficient for her to be motivated. However, (2) 
entails that entertaining a belief is not sufficient to be moti-
vated, but that a non-cognitive state is needed. It follows in (C) 
that a moral judgment does not consist in a belief, and that it, 
at least partly, consists in a non-cognitive state. Hence, the ar-
gument is thought to entail that Cognitivism is false and pro-
vide an argument for Non-Cognitivism.  
It might now be inquired whether it is possible to construe 
a corresponding argument with regard to aesthetic judgments. 
The strongest version of Aesthetic Internalism with any initial 
plausibility would be the following. 
 
Strong Aesthetic Internalism: necessarily, if a person S judges that an 
object is aesthetically valuable, then she is at least somewhat moti-
vated to acquaint herself with it9.  
 
Strong Aesthetic Internalism finds support in our response to 
thought experiments like Case 2. A possible response to this 
case is, as we noted, that someone who utters “Wagner’s Par-
sifal is absolutely amazing”, while at the same lacking any mo-
tivation to listen to it, actually does not think that the opera is 
valuable. We can then formulate the following argument: 
                                                            
9 In what follows, “object” refers to works in literature, visual arts, music, 
and dance, as well as other artefacts which are targets of aesthetic 
judgments. We might also want to include natural objects, such as natural 
sceneries. I use “acquaint” to refer to different ways of getting to know 
these objects by reading, looking, listening, and touching, etc. For an 
alternative manner of formulating a strong version of Aesthetic Internalism, 
see King unpublished. See also Archer 2013: 71. For a related suggestion as 
regards taste judgments, see Eriksson 2016: 775-94. 
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(1’) Strong Aesthetic Internalism: necessarily, if a person S 
judges that an object is aesthetically valuable, then she is at 
least somewhat motivated to acquaint herself with it.  
(2) Humean Theory of Motivation: a person S having a belief is 
not sufficient for her to be motivated. In order to be motivat-
ed, she needs to have a non-cognitive state in the form of a 
desire. 
(C’) Aesthetic Cognitivism is false: a person S’s aesthetic judg-
ment does not consist in a belief. An aesthetic judgment at 
least partly consists in a non-cognitive state. 
 
By the same type of reasoning as that employed with regard 
to moral judgments, it might be thought to follow that an aes-
thetic judgment does not consists in a belief and that it at least 
partly consists in a non-cognitive state. Hence, it might be 
thought that it entails that Aesthetic Cognitivism is false and 
provides an argument for Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism.  
However, despite what might seem to be the case, the 
conclusion does not follow from the premises in either of 
these arguments. To see this, consider the aesthetic argument 
(1’)-(C’)10. Strong Aesthetic Internalism claims that it is con-
ceptually necessary that if a person makes an aesthetic judg-
ment, then it follows that she is motivated accordingly. Now, 
there might be different explanations of why this is the case. 
According to one alternative, it is conceptually necessary that 
an aesthetic judgment partly or wholly consists in a motiva-
tional state. In the literature, this view is often captured by 
saying that motivation is “internal” or “intrinsic” to a judg-
ment. According to another alternative, we classify a person’s 
                                                            
10 The same considerations apply to Moral Internalism. See Tresan 2006: 
143-65, and Strandberg 2011a: 244. 
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judgment as an “aesthetic judgment” only if she is motivated 
accordingly. This alternative is compatible with the judgment 
itself not playing any part at all in the explanation of why she is 
motivated. It is, in other words, compatible with motivation 
begin “external” or “extrinsic” to the judgment. In the litera-
ture, it is standardly presumed that Internalism should be un-
derstood in accordance with the first alternative, and it is only 
recently that it has been noticed that it is compatible with the 
second alternative. 
What is important to observe is the following. First, scenar-
ios like Case 2 only provide support to the second alternative 
but not to the first alternative. In considering such cases, we 
might perhaps respond by doubting that the person in ques-
tion actually makes any aesthetic judgment. However, this 
does not provide any support for the view that it either wholly 
or partly consists in a motivational state. Second, in order for 
(C’) to follow from (1’) and (2), the first alternative needs to be 
true. It is only if Strong Aesthetic Internalism is understood to 
entail that an aesthetic judgment wholly or partly consists in a 
motivational state that it, together with a Humean theory of 
motivation, entails that Aesthetic Cognitivism is false and pro-
vides support to Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism. This does not 
mean, of course, that the two strong versions of Internalism 
are false. It does mean, though, that they cannot have the dia-
lectical role they initially might be presumed to have in the 
debate between Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism about moral 
and aesthetic judgments. 
The discussion so far might be taken to indicate that Moral 
and Aesthetic Internalism are on equal footing. There are 
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grounds to think, however, that the support for the latter view 
is weaker than that for the former11.  
There is a principal argument for this contention: moral 
judgments and aesthetic judgments appear to be fundamen-
tally different types of judgments in that the former are ac-
tion-focused whereas the latter are object-focused12. Moral 
judgments are normative judgments that concern the moral 
rightness and wrongness of actions. This means in turn that 
they make reference to persons, since it is persons that act. A 
moral judgment to the effect that an action is morally right en-
tails that it is right for someone to perform the action, where 
“someone” might be a single person, all persons, or a subset 
of all persons. The moral judgment referred to in Strong Moral 
Internalism is a person’s judgment that it is morally right that 
she performs a certain action, since it is only a moral judgment 
of this type that can have any necessary connection to her mo-
tivation to act. By contrast, aesthetic judgments are evaluative 
judgments that concern the aesthetic value, or lack thereof, 
belonging to objects. This might in turn be taken to indicate 
that they need not involve any reference to actions and, 
hence, not to persons. The aesthetic judgment referred to in 
this claim is a person’s judgment that an object is aesthetically 
valuable. It is not obvious that her judgment entails anything 
                                                            
11 In my view, there are powerful arguments against Moral Internalism and 
for Moral Externalism (see e.g. Strandberg 2011a, and 2013). Indeed, I think 
that the line of argument I pursue in this paper as regards Aesthetic 
Internalism is applicable, mutatis mutandis, to Moral Internalism. However, I 
still think the support for Aesthetic Internalism is weaker than that for Moral 
Internalism.  
12 Cf. Kivy 1980: 358-60, Sinnott-Armstrong 2010: 65, and Strandberg 2010b: 
51-67. For responses to this difference, see Archer 2013: 80, and King un-
published. 
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with relevance for her motivation to act in any manner what-
soever.  
This difference between moral and aesthetic judgments 
provides a prima facie reason to think that Internalism is more 
plausible as regards the former view than the latter. However, 
it should not make us draw the conclusion that Aesthetic In-
ternalism is incorrect. Rather, it means that if there is a viable 
version of this claim, it needs to forge a significant connection 
between aesthetic judgments and actions. I will return to this 
possibility in the next section.  
What is more, standard arguments against Strong Moral In-
ternalism apply at least as forcefully against its aesthetic coun-
terpart. A common argument against Strong Moral Internalism 
is that it appears possible to imagine an amoralist: a person 
who judges that an action is morally right, but who is not the 
least motivated to perform it. The argument is that since it ap-
pears possible to conceive of an amoralist, there cannot be a 
conceptually necessary connection between moral judgments 
and motivation13. Moreover, it has been argued that a person 
might make a moral judgment without being accordingly moti-
vated in case she suffers from a mental condition such as apa-
thy, exhaustion, or depression14.  
In a similar manner, it appears possible to imagine what 
might be called an amaesthete: a person who judges that an 
object is aesthetically valuable, but who is not in the least mo-
                                                            
13 In the literature, internalists have tried to explain away this impression in 
various manners. For example, R.M. Hare famously argues that apparent 
amoralists use moral sentences in “inverted commas” (see Hare 1952: 124-
5). For another explanation, see Smith 1994: 67-71. 
14 For example, it seems possible to imagine a mother who judges that it is 
right for her to help her son to get rid of his drug problems, but is not at all 
motivated to do so because she is severely depressed.  
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tivated to acquaint herself with it15. Indeed, in view of the in-
dicated difference between the two types of value judgments, 
it is presumably even easier to imagine an amaesthete than an 
amoralist: as it is not obvious that an aesthetic judgment has 
any significant connection to actions, it seems easier to con-
ceive of a person making such a judgment without being ac-
cordingly motivated.  
Furthermore, as is the case with moral judgments, it also 
seems plausible that a person can make an aesthetic judgment 
without being accordingly motivated if she suffers from a psy-
chological condition such as apathy, exhaustion, or depres-
sion, etc. Consider the following case. 
 
Case 3. Cecilia thinks that Wagner’s Parsifal is aesthetically valuable. 
The opera is her absolute favorite music piece. However, she suffers 
from a deep depression which makes her incapable to enjoy the 
music. Indeed, listening to it makes her remember happier days and 
only increases her depression. She is not motivated at all to listen to 
it.  
 
It is a commonsensical observation that our psychological 
conditions can influence to what extent we are motivated to, 
say, listen a piece of music or read a novel. Accordingly, it is 
plausible to think that these conditions can influence us in 
such a way that we are not motivated at all to involve in these 
activities, in spite of our high esteem of the work in question. 
To sum up, Strong Aesthetic Internalism cannot function as 
a premise in an argument against Aesthetic Cognitivism and 
for Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism, and there are grounds to be-
                                                            
15 Cf. Archer 2013: 72-4, King unpublished. I avoid using “anaesthete” since it 
has a meaning quite different from the one I intend. 
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lieve that this version of Aesthetic Internalism is mistaken. This 
means two things. First, Strong Aesthetic Internalism cannot 
be employed in an argument against Aesthetic Cognitivism 
and for Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism. Second, there are grounds 
to believe that Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism is incorrect. I can 
merely outline the structure of this argument here. Assume 
that Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism is correct and that aesthetic 
judgments consist in some type of non-cognitive states. Now, 
it is generally accepted that what characterizes non-cognitive 
states is that they motivate to action. It is then plausible to as-
sume that if a person judges that an object is aesthetically val-
uable, she is motivated to acquaint herself with it. However, as 
Strong Aesthetic Internalism is mistaken, this is not the case. 
Hence, there are grounds to think that Aesthetic Non-
Cognitivism is incorrect16. Moreover, non-cognitivist views in 
general are vulnerable to a number of difficulties, most im-
portantly the renowned Frege-Geach problem. As indicated, 
internalist considerations are the primary argument for non-
cognitivist positions. Thus, since Strong Aesthetic Internalism 
                                                            
16 It might be objected that Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism is needed to explain 
disagreements in aesthetic judgments, at least given that relativism is initially 
plausible with regard to such judgments. A related argument has been 
suggested concerning disagreements in taste judgments (cf. e.g. Huvenes 
2012: 167-81, and Eriksson 2016: 775-94). This consideration gives rise to a 
number of issues that I cannot address in the present paper. However, it might 
be suggested that, if relativism is found attractive, disagreement in aesthetic 
judgments can be explained in terms of their being connected to conflicting 
attitudes. According to a cognitivist account, utterances of a sentence stating 
that an object is aesthetically valuable standardly pragmatically implicate 
attitudes, and the utterances of different speakers might implicate conflicting 
attitudes. See Marques forthcoming, and the proposal in Section 8 below.  
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does not provide any support for Aesthetic Non-Cognitivism, 
there are grounds to believe that the latter view is incorrect17. 
The fact that Strong Aesthetic Internalism is mistaken does 
not mean, however, that there are no versions of Aesthetic In-
ternalism that are significant. First, there are weaker versions 
of this view that, although they do not have the same implica-
tions as Strong Aesthetic Internalism, put important con-
straints on the content of aesthetic judgments. Second, as we 
shall see, they also raise to two normative puzzles with impli-
cations for the normative domain in general. 
 
4. Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism 
In the last section, I mentioned that Strong Moral Internalism 
is vulnerable to the difficulty that a person’s moral judgment 
does not need to be accompanied by motivation if she suffers 
from a certain psychological condition. This has made a num-
ber of metaethicists employ a weaker version of Internalism, 
as follows. 
 
Conditional Moral Internalism: necessarily, if a person S judges that it 
is morally right that she performs an action, then she is at least 
somewhat motivated to perform it, given that she fulfills condition C. 
 
This claim represents merely a type of Internalism in which 
“condition C” needs to be specified18. It has turned out to be 
difficult to do so in a way that does not make the resulting 
version of Internalism trivial. The most promising alternative 
                                                            
17 For an overview of the debate about the Frege-Geach problem, see 
Schroeder 2010. 
18 For various ways of understanding “condition C”, see Björnsson et al. 
2014: 1-20. 
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appears to be to understand it as “given that she is practically 
rational”. The psychological conditions that are assumed to 
explain why a person who makes a moral judgment is not ac-
cordingly motivated can be seen as indicating failure in ration-
ality. The resulting claim might be called “Moral Rationalist In-
ternalism”. 
This claim requires explanation. What would be the rea-
sons for thinking that a person who judges that an action is 
right necessarily is motivated to perform it only if she is ra-
tional? To my understanding, it rests on three claims which 
entail it19: 
 
(1) necessarily, if a person S judges that it is morally right that 
she performs an action, then she judges that she has a moral 
reason to perform it. 
(2) Moral reasons consist in normative reasons: necessarily, if 
a person S has a moral reason to perform an action, then she 
has a normative reason to perform the action.  
(3) Normative Internalism: necessarily, if a person S judges 
that she has a normative reason to perform an action, then 
she is at least somewhat motivated to perform that action, 
given that she is practically rational. 
(C) Moral Rationalist Internalism: necessarily, if a person S 
judges that it is morally right that she performs an action, then 
she is at least somewhat motivated to perform it, given that 
she is practically rational. 
 
                                                            
19 See e.g. Smith 1994: Ch. 3 and 4. For discussion, see e.g. Strandberg 2013: 
25-51. For an interesting argument against various version of Moral 
Internalism, see Archer 2013: 74-7, and Archer forthcoming. 
Caj Strandberg, Aesthetic Internalism and two normative puzzles 
 
 38 
As far as I understand, claim (1) is uncontroversial. If a per-
son judges that it is morally right for her to perform a certain 
action, she judges that, from the perspective of morality, there 
is something that speaks in favour of her performing it. That is, 
her judgment entails that she has a moral reason to perform 
the action. This claim does not entail any particular notion 
about what moral reasons consist in, and is thus compatible 
with various views in this respect. Claim (2) is also fairly uncon-
troversial. It is generally acknowledged that moral reasons are 
“real reasons” rather than conventional reasons like etiquette 
reasons which solely rest on arbitrary conventions. Lastly, 
claim (3) is often considered as a platitude in metaethics. If a 
person judges that she has a normative reason to perform a 
certain action, it might seem that she is not fully rational in her 
own lights unless she has at least some motivation to perform 
it20. 
In view of what was said at the end of the previous section, 
we should consider a corresponding version of Aesthetic In-
ternalism. 
 
Conditional Aesthetic Internalism: necessarily, if a person S judges 
that an object is aesthetically valuable, then she is at least somewhat 
motivated to acquaint herself with it, given that she fulfills condition 
C. 
 
As is the case with its moral analogue, it is difficult to explicate 
this claim in a way that provides a non-trivial interpretation of 
it. For example, it would risk to trivialize it by spelling out 
“condition C” as “aesthetically sensitive”, as it appears difficult 
                                                            
20 See e.g. Smith 1994: Ch. 5. See also e.g. Korsgaard 1986: 5-25, and Wedgwood 
2007: Ch. 1. 
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to explain this notion in a way that does not make reference to 
a person having “correct responses” – such as being “appro-
priately motivated” – in relation to her aesthetic judgments. 
In light of what was said in the last section, we should con-
sider understanding “condition C” as “given that she is practi-
cally rational”. We might refer to the resulting view as “Ra-
tionalist Aesthetic Internalism”. Again, this view requires ex-
planation. However, it is possible to construe a novel argu-
ment, corresponding to (1)-(3) above, which entails it: 
 
(1’) necessarily, if a person S judges that an object is aestheti-
cally valuable, then she judges that she has an aesthetic rea-
son to acquaint herself with it. 
(2’) Aesthetic reasons consist in normative reasons: necessari-
ly, if a person S has an aesthetic reason to acquaint herself 
with an object, then she has a normative reason to do so. 
(3) Normative Internalism: necessarily, if a person S judges 
that she has a normative reason to perform an action, then 
she is at least somewhat motivated to perform that action, 
given that she is practically rational. 
(C’) Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism: necessarily, if a person S 
judges that an object is aesthetically valuable, then she is at 
least somewhat motivated to acquaint herself with it, given 
that she is practically rational. 
 
According to claim (1’), a person’s judgments that an object 
is aesthetically valuable entails that, from an aesthetic per-
spective, it has some feature that talks in favour of her ac-
quainting herself with it. That is, her aesthetic judgment en-
tails that she has an aesthetic reason to acquaint herself with 
the object. The term “aesthetic reason” might sound unfamil-
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iar, but the phenomenon is common and commonsensical. As 
I use the term, it refers to a certain type of reason to get ac-
quainted with an object by reading it, looking at it, listening to 
it, touching it, etc., whatever constitutes such a reason. Thus, 
my usage is neutral as regards what provides with aesthetic 
reasons, and is consequently compatible with various views in 
this respect. There are two basic rationales for this usage. 
First, it seems implausible to ascribe to people making aes-
thetic judgments a particular view about what constitute aes-
thetic reasons. What provides an aesthetic reason is thus not a 
conceptual, but rather a substantial matter21. Second, taking a 
stand on this issue would risk ruling out a number of distin-
guished views in aesthetics on merely conceptual grounds. It 
would be implausible to contend that a number of renowned 
philosophers are simply conceptually confused when arguing 
for a certain view about what provides with aesthetic rea-
sons22. 
It is reasonable to think that a person has an aesthetic rea-
son to acquaint herself with an object insofar as it provides her 
with an “aesthetic experience”. It seems further plausible to 
assume that such an experience involves a certain pleasurable 
experience or enjoyment. However, it is implausible to pre-
                                                            
21 In this context, it is crucial that I am concerned with judgments about 
aesthetic value rather than judgments about aesthetic beauty. It might be 
that the latter judgment does have a conceptual connection to enjoyment. 
Cf. Railton 1998: 91. 
22 To get a sense of the great variety as regards what might provide aesthetic 
reasons, consider the numerous theories about aesthetic experiences 
discussed in Collinson 1992: 111-78. For example, aesthetic experience has 
been understood in terms of contemplation, will-lessness, disinterestedness, 
significant form, psychical distance, and a particular type of complex 
pleasure corresponding to the object’s aesthetic properties. And so on. For 
further illustration, see e.g. Kieran 2001: 292-305.  
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sume that this would be a matter of conceptual necessity. 
First, this would run the risk of ruling out the possibility that 
certain aesthetic experiences can be quite demanding and 
even unpleasant. Second, it is controversial whether “aesthet-
ic experience” refers to an experience which has a certain type 
of internal feature, e.g. being pleasurable in a particular man-
ner, or merely to an experience which is about an object’s ex-
ternal features of a certain type23. Third, it suffers from the 
same type of problems as indicated above: It is farfetched to 
ascribe to a person who makes an aesthetic judgment a par-
ticular view about aesthetic reasons and experiences, and it 
would mean that a number of prominent views about aesthet-
ic reasons and experiences proposed by esteemed philoso-
phers are conceptually erroneous24. 
According to claim (2’), aesthetic reasons consist in norma-
tive reasons, which means that they constitute “real” norma-
                                                            
23 For an overview of the debate between “internalism” and “externalism” 
about aesthetic experiences, see Shelley 2013. 
24 According to a response-dependence analysis of aesthetic judgments, a 
judgment to the effect that an object is aesthetically valuable entails that 
the object would elicit a certain response in an aesthetically ideal observer. 
The notion of aesthetic reasons above is compatible with this view. First, it 
appears implausible to think that the relevant response consists in a 
pleasurable experience, since this would make the analysis too narrow. 
Second, an aesthetic reason should not be understood as the fact that an 
observer has a certain response, but rather what would elicit such a 
response. Third, I think the response-dependent analysis is best understood 
as an analysis of aesthetic value rather than aesthetic judgments. There is a 
further objection against the line of argument above. According to monism 
about value bearers, it is only states of affairs that are valuable, whereas 
objects are not. It might then be suggested that aesthetic value should be 
understood in terms of the value of a person having a certain pleasurable 
experience. First, I think this might be correct, but it would not be a 
conceptual, but a substantial, truth. Second, it is plausible to deny the 
monist view that states of affairs are the only value bearers (see e.g. 
Rønnow-Rasmussen 2011: Ch. 10). 
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tive reasons rather than merely conventional reasons whose 
existence depends on arbitrary conventions, like etiquette 
reasons or reasons to follow a rule in a certain game25. We are 
already familiar with claim (3). 
Interestingly, there are grounds to think that claims (1’)-(3), 
and the resulting Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism, are able to 
elucidate some of the difficulties troubling its predecessor. 
First, in the last section we distinguished between two alterna-
tive ways of understanding Strong Aesthetic Internalism. Ac-
cording to the first alternative, a person’s aesthetic judgment 
wholly or partly consists in a motivational state, while we ac-
cording to the second alternative classify her judgment as an 
“aesthetic judgment” only if it is accompanied by motivation. 
As regards Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism, things are more 
complicated. On the one hand, it means that an aesthetic 
judgment neither partly nor wholly consist in a motivational 
state26. On the other hand, it suggests that there must be 
something about an aesthetic judgment which explains the 
necessary connection between aesthetic judgments and moti-
vation. It is reasonable to maintain that the fact that we classi-
fy a person’s judgment as an aesthetic judgment only if she is 
accordingly motivated does not need to be explained by any-
thing about the judgment itself. By contrast, it is much less 
plausible to contend that the fact that we classify a person’s 
judgment as an aesthetic judgment only if she is accordingly 
motivated on condition she is rational would have nothing to 
do with the judgment itself. The judgment needs to have some 
                                                            
25 Cf. King unpublished. I follow the received view that the notion of normative 
reasons is conceptually connected to the notion of rationality. 
26 If it did, a person’s aesthetic judgment would be sufficient by itself for her 
to be motivated, irrespective of her being rational or not. 
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feature which explains that someone who makes an aesthetic 
judgment is guaranteed to be accordingly motivated only if she 
is rational, whereas a person who makes such a judgment with-
out being fully rational is not guaranteed to be thus motivated. 
An explanation can be found in claims (1’)-(3), which describe 
the connection between aesthetic judgments, reasons, rational-
ity, and motivation. Second, we noticed that, in contrast to 
moral judgments, there is no obvious connection between aes-
thetic judgments and actions. Consequently, Strong Aesthetic 
Internalism has weaker support and is more vulnerable to coun-
terexamples than its moral counterpart. By contrast, Rationalist 
Aesthetic Internalism does forge a significant connection be-
tween aesthetic judgments and actions. The way it does so is al-
so described in (1’)-(3). In particular, there are conceptual links 
between aesthetic judgments, judgments about aesthetic rea-
sons, aesthetic reasons and normative reasons, and judgments 
about normative reasons and motivation, on the assumption of 
rationality. This fact makes the resulting version of Aesthetic In-
ternalism less open to counterexamples than its predecessor. 
Third, according to Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism someone 
who makes an aesthetic judgment needs to be accordingly mo-
tivated only if she is rational. It is thus able to account for sce-
narios like Case 3. 
However, it is plausible to suspect that Rationalist Aesthetic 
Internalism is weaker than its moral counterpart. Especially, 
there are grounds to think that the first view is vulnerable to 
various types of counterexamples the second view is not. Con-
sider the following case. 
 
Case 4. Cecilia thinks that Wagner’s Parsifal is aesthetically valuable. 
The opera is her absolute favorite music piece and she has listened 
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to it hundreds of times. Indeed, as she has listened to it so many 
times, she has become tired of doing so, and it does not give her any 
enjoyment. She is not motivated at all to listen to it. 
 
It seems plausible to think that such a case is conceivable. The 
fact that a person who judges that an object is aesthetically 
valuable lacks motivation to acquaint herself with it might be 
due to the mere fact that she has acquainted herself with it so 
many times that she does not get any enjoyment of doing so 
anymore. Moreover, her lack of motivation needs hardly to be 
a matter of irrationality. On the contrary, it can be regarded as 
a reasonable response to her lack of enjoyment. Consider fur-
ther the following case. 
 
Case 5. Cecilia thinks that Wagner’s Parsifal is aesthetically valuable. 
Indeed, from reading about the history of classical music and over-
hearing her opera loving friends talking about operas, she has come 
to think that it is one of the greatest pieces of music ever written. 
However, she has very little knowledge of classical music or experi-
ence of listening to it, and does not get any enjoyment from attend-
ing opera performances or listening to recordings of operas. She is 
not motivated at all to listen to Parsifal.  
 
Again, it seems plausible to think that such a case is conceiva-
ble. The fact that a person who judges that an object is aes-
thetically valuable is not motivated to acquaint herself with it 
might be due to the mere fact that she is aware that she 
would not get any enjoyment from doing so, since she lacks 
relevant knowledge and experience. Moreover, her not being 
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motivated to acquaint herself with the object does not seem 
to be a matter of irrationality27. 
 
5. First normative puzzle 
Thus far, we have not found any version of Aesthetic Internal-
ism that is not vulnerable to serious difficulties. It is now time 
to observe that considerations about this view also give rise to 
an intriguing puzzle whose relevance goes far beyond the aes-
thetic area. As we have seen, there appear to fairly uncontro-
versial counterexamples to Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism. 
At the same time, claims (1’)-(3) that entail this view have ini-
tial plausibility. Thus, we have to give up at least one of these 
claims. However, none of the available alternatives seems im-
mediately attractive. In brief: If we reject (1’), we are forced to 
accept that a person’s judgment that something is valuable 
does not need to have any implication whatsoever for her rea-
                                                            
27 In relation to Case 3, it might be responded that there is a modified ver-
sion of Strong Aesthetic Internalism, as follows. 
Modified Strong Aesthetic Internalism: necessarily, if a person S judges that 
an object is aesthetically valuable, then she is at least somewhat motivated 
to acquaint herself with it or with an object which, in her view, is similar to 
it, given that she is practically rational (cf. Strandberg 2011b: 53. For criti-
cism, see Archer 2013: 71). 
However, I think this claim has important shortcomings. First, it refers to 
“similar” which makes it vague. Second, it is vulnerable to the following type 
of cases. 
Case 6. Cecilia thinks that Wagner’s Parsifal is aesthetically valuable. The 
opera is her absolute favorite music piece and she has listed to it and works 
similar to it – other works by Wagner, operas by Strauss, Korngold, Humper-
dinck, etc. – hundreds of times. Indeed, as she has listened to Parsifal, and 
works that resemble it, so many times, she has become tired of listening to 
that type of music. She is not motivated at all to listen to Parsifal or any 
opera that resembles it. 
Although Case 6 is more controversial than Case 5, I think we should accept 
that it describes a conceivable scenario. 
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sons about what to do. If we reject (2’), we are forced to ac-
cept that aesthetic reasons are not real normative reasons. If 
we reject (3), we are forced to give up a claim that widely is 
considered as a platitude in metaethics. Consequently, which-
ever claim is rejected we will need to revise our conceptions 
about the normative domain. 
In my view, there are strong grounds to retain claim (2’). In 
view of the tremendously important role aesthetic considera-
tions play in our lives, aesthetic reasons should be acknowl-
edged to constitute genuine normative reasons. Aesthetic rea-
sons — reasons to read thought provoking books, listen to thrill-
ing music, or look at breathtaking paintings — cannot plausibly 
be seen to constitute merely conventional reasons, like eti-
quette reasons to eat with the fork in your left hand and the 
knife in your right, or say “Bless!” when someone has sneezed. 
With regard to claim (1’), I am more hesitant. On the one 
hand, there are grounds to reject (1’). It might be granted that 
a person’s judgment that an object is aesthetically valuable 
entails that there is a reason to get acquainted with it which 
someone has, but that she does not need to have it. In particu-
lar, her judgment entails that those have a reason to acquaint 
themselves with the object who will receive enjoyment from 
doing so. However, since she realizes that she will not get any 
enjoyment from such activities, it does not entail that she has 
any reason to acquaint herself with the object. Consider Cases 
4-6. On the present view, Cecilia’s judgment that Parsifal is 
valuable entails that one has reason to listen to it if one will 
enjoy doing so, but since she realizes that this does not apply 
to her, it does not entail that she has any such reason. 
On the other hand, there are grounds to retain (1’). First, it 
seems generally to be the case that a person’s judgment that 
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something is valuable entails that, from a particular perspec-
tive, it has a feature that provides her with at least some rea-
son to act in a certain manner. Especially, it seems generally to 
be the case that a person’s judgment that something is valua-
ble entails that she has reason to perform a certain action giv-
en that it is available to her. To illustrate, consider a value 
judgment that at first might appear to have no implications 
whatsoever for your reasons to act: you judge that it is excel-
lent that a new rocket will be sent to outer space to investi-
gate the likelihood of extraterrestrial life. However, if you had 
been in a position to send out such a rocket, it seems that 
your value judgment entails that you have a reason to do so. 
So, denying (1’) appears to suggest that aesthetic judgments 
need to differ from other value judgments in a way that would 
require special explanation. It appears that we would be 
committed to saying that, as regards this particular type of 
value judgments, a person’s value judgment does not have any 
implications whatsoever for what she has reason to do even if 
she is in the position to perform the action in question. Second, 
if a person forcibly maintains that she does not have any rea-
son whatsoever to acquaint herself with an object, we might 
hesitate to ascribe to her the judgment that the object is aes-
thetically valuable. For example, if Cecilia in Cases 4-6 main-
tains that she has no reason at all to listen to Parsifal, we 
might hesitate to ascribe to her the judgment that the opera is 
valuable. This observation can be taken to confirm the view 
that aesthetic judgments do function like other value judg-
ments in the indicated respect.  
It might further be suggested that (1’) can explain why it 
might seem that a person’s aesthetic judgment does not entail 
that she has any aesthetic reason to acquaint herself with the 
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object in question. As noticed, there are grounds to use “aes-
thetic reason” in a way that is neutral as regards what pro-
vides such reasons. For instance, it should not be used in a 
way entailing that a person has an aesthetic reason to ac-
quaint herself with an object only if it would give her a pleas-
urable experience. Consider Cases 4 and 6. Cecilia’s judgment 
that Parsifal is aesthetically valuable entails that she has an 
aesthetic reason to listening to it. However, this reason is, in 
her view, outweighed by another reason. In particular, the fact 
that she has listened to it so many times that it does not give 
her any enjoyment outweighs her reason to do so. It might 
then mistakenly appear that her judgment does not have any 
implications for her reasons to act. Moreover, in view of the 
fact that Cecilia thinks that Parsifal is of extraordinarily high 
aesthetic value, and she has received much enjoyment from 
listening to it in the past, it seems farfetched to ascribe to her 
the view that she now does not have any reason do so. As a 
result of her lacking enjoyment to listening to the music, she is 
not accordingly motivated. Consider Case 5. It might be sug-
gested that Cecilia’s aesthetic judgment entails that she has a 
reason to listen to Parsifal, but that this reason, in her view, is 
outweighed by a reason not to do so because she would not 
enjoy it, due to lack of experience and knowledge. Again, this 
means that she is not accordingly motivated28. Thus, I am in-
                                                            
28 It might be objected that this alternative is vulnerable to the following 
type of case. 
Case 7. Cecilia thinks that Wagner’s Parsifal is aesthetically valuable. Indeed, 
from reading about the history of classical music and overhearing her opera 
loving friends talking about operas, she has come to think that it is one of 
the greatest pieces of music ever written. However, she thinks that she does 
not have any aesthetic reason to listen to it because it would not give her 
any aesthetic experience to do so, due to her lack of knowledge and 
experiences of classical music. 
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clined to retain (1’) although the issue needs more discussion 
that I can provide in the present paper. 
However, I do think there are grounds to doubt claim (3): 
Normative Internalism. This claim entails that it is conceptually 
necessary that for each reason a person judges she has, it 
needs to be correlated with at least some motivation, in order 
for her to be rational. It might be worried that this claim forges 
a too strong connection between normative judgments and 
motivation. As (3) does not concern aesthetics in particular, 
the argument against it can be quite general by appealing to 
other types of considerations. There are in particular three 
types of problems with this claim29.  
First, it is the problem of differing strengths of normative 
judgments. Assume that a person judges she has a very strong 
reason to perform a certain action and a very weak reason to 
perform a certain other action. Assume further that she judges 
that the actions in question are practically incompatible, i.e. 
that she cannot perform both. For example, suppose she 
knows that giving a certain medicine to her son is the only way 
to save his life. However, suppose further that she also knows 
that if she gives him the medicine, she will not have time to 
buy herself a new outfit in the chic boutique before it closes. 
Suppose that she therefore judges that she has an extremely 
strong reason to get her son the medicine but an extremely 
                                                                                                                  
It might first be responded that if Cecilia judges that she does not have any 
aesthetic reason to listen to Parsifal, she would not consider it valuable in 
the first place. It might perhaps appear that she judges it is aesthetically 
valuable because she thinks it is valuable in some other respect, e.g. 
instrumentally valuable by giving her opportunity to meet her good friends. 
Second, it was argued above that whether aesthetic reasons are provided by 
aesthetic experiences is a substantial matter. 
 
29 For the first two difficulties, see Strandberg 2013: 31-7. 
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weak reason not to do so. It seems farfetched to conclude that 
she needs to be irrational if she lacks motivation to not getting 
her son the medicine. We might accept that she might be ra-
tional even if she is motivated not to give her son the medi-
cine. But it seems implausible to maintain that she needs to be 
motivated in that manner in order to be fully rational30. 
Second, it is the problem of competing normative judgments 
of equal strengths. Assume that a person judges that she has a 
reason of a certain strength to perform a certain action and a 
reasonof exactly the same strength to perform another action. 
Assume again that she judges that the actions are practically in-
compatible. For example, suppose she judges that she has a 
reason to have an ice cream and a reason to have a brownie, 
and that these reasons are exactly as strong, but that she can-
not have both since she cannot afford it. We are free to accept 
that she might be motivated to have both even if she is rational. 
However, once again it seems implausible to maintain that she 
needs to be motivated in that manner in order to be rational.  
Third, it is the problem of instrumental overdetermination. 
Assume that a person has a certain end and that she thinks that 
there are a number of different means that would fulfil that end 
equally well. For example, imagine a person who has moved to 
a new place and has as an end to get to know her neighbors. 
She thinks that there are a number of different means that 
would satisfy this end just a well: she might invite them for cof-
fee, throw a garden party for them, or help them babysitting, 
etc. Let us assume that she thinks that for each of these means 
                                                            
30 A related argument has been directed against Michael Smith whose 
defence of Rationalist Moral Internalism rests on Normative Internalism. See 
Copp 1997: 45-6; Wallace 2006: 187-8; Gert 2008: 16-7, and Schroeder 
2007: 166-7. 
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she has a corresponding reason. In the example, she thinks that 
she has a reason to invite her neighbors for coffee, a reason to 
throw a garden party, a reason to help them babysitting, etc. It 
is very plausible to think that, in order for her to be rational, she 
needs to be motivated to perform an action corresponding to at 
least one such means. However, we would presumably not 
maintain that she is irrational if she is not motivated to perform 
an action corresponding to each such means. Thus, she is not ir-
rational if she is not motivated to invite her neighbors for lunch 
and throw a garden party and help them babysitting, etc. 
Thus, I suggest that in claims (1’)-(3) we deny claim (3), Nor-
mative Internalism. It might then be queried what the connection 
is between normative judgments and motivation under rationali-
ty. The natural suggestion is the following. 
 
(3’) Weak Normative Internalism: necessarily, if a person S judges 
that she has a normative reason to perform an action, then she is at 
least somewhat motivated to perform that action, given that (i) she 
is practically rational and (ii) she does not judge that she has a 
stronger, or at least as strong, normative reason to perform another 
action which is practically incompatible with the former action31. 
 
As easily can be seen, this claim is not affected by the first two 
problems mentioned above. It is another matter whether it 
avoids the third problem, which I will return to below. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
31 Cf. Wedgwood 2007: 25; Archer 2013: 78, and Ridge 2015: 135-49. 
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6. Weak Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism 
It might now be maintained that the reasoning in the last sec-
tion means that there actually is a plausible version of Aesthetic 
Internalism. More precisely, claims (1’)-(3’) entail 
 
Weak Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism: necessarily, if a person S judg-
es that an object is aesthetically valuable, then she is at least some-
what motivated to acquaint herself with it, given that (i) she is practi-
cally rational and (ii) she does not judge that she has a stronger, or at 
least as strong, normative reason to perform another action which is 
practically incompatible with the former action. 
 
This view is considerably weaker than the version of Aesthetic 
Internalism we started discussing. It fulfils however our initial 
description of such a view: it means that there is a necessary, 
non-trivial, connection between a person’s aesthetic judgment 
and her motivation to act. 
However, I think it can be argued that also this version of 
Aesthetic Internalism faces difficulties. One problem is that it 
is lacking in explanatory value. To see this, return to the type 
of scenario that motivated this type of view in the first place: 
Case 2. Strong Aesthetic Internalism appears able to explain 
why we find the person’s utterance puzzling. However, we 
have now ended up with a version of Aesthetic Internalism 
which is so convoluted that it fails to do so32.  
First, Weak Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism is not suffi-
cient to explain why we find the person’s utterance puzzling in 
Case 2. This view includes two conditions, (i) and (ii). It means 
that it can explain why we would find it puzzling that someone 
                                                            
32 For a similar argument with regard Moral Internalism, see Strandberg 
2013a: 38-9. For a similar point, see Archer 2013: 82. 
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utters a sentence like “Wagner’s Parsifal is absolutely amaz-
ing” without being accordingly motivated only granted that we 
can assume that both these conditions are fulfilled. It seems 
plausible to suspect, however, that we would find her utter-
ance puzzling even if we do not have any view as to whether 
(ii) is fulfilled. In other words, if a person utters a sentence say-
ing that an object is aesthetically valuable, but is not motivat-
ed to acquaint herself with it, we would find this puzzling even 
if we do not have any opinion whatsoever as to whether she 
thinks she has a stronger, or at least as strong, reason to do 
something else. Second, Weak Rationalist Aesthetic Internal-
ism is not necessary to explain why we find her utterance puz-
zling. Assume that a person utters a sentence like “Wagner’s 
Parsifal is absolutely amazing” without being accordingly mo-
tivated. Assume further that we know she thinks she has a 
reason to do something else and that this reason is stronger 
than her reason to listen to the opera. However, we would still 
find her utterance puzzling. We would presumably wonder 
why she utters this sentence when she is not motivated to lis-
ten to the music in question. The version of Internalism under 
consideration is incapable of explaining this. According to this 
view, such a case has a certain feature that would account for 
her not being motivated. As we know that the case has this 
feature, the view predicts that we should not find her utter-
ance particularly puzzling. However, since we still find it puz-
zling, it appears that this version of Aesthetic Internalism is 
unable to explain our response.  
This does of course not mean that Weak Rationalist Aes-
thetic Internalism is false. What it does mean, however, is that 
this view does not get any support from the type of case that 
motivated Aesthetic Internalism in the first place.  
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Furthermore, it is plausible to argue for the stronger conten-
tion that Weak Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism is mistaken. Let 
us notice that this view has an important implication. Assume 
that a person judges that an object is aesthetically valuable and 
further judges that she does not have any reason that is strong-
er, or at least as strong, to perform an action which is practically 
incompatible with acquainting herself with the object. Assume 
further that she is not motivated at all to do so. According to 
Weak Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism, it follows that she must 
be irrational. However, this result seems implausible. Consider 
the following case. 
 
Case 8. Cecilia thinks that Wagner’s Parsifal is aesthetically valuable. 
However, she has very little knowledge of classical music or experi-
ence of listening to it, and does not get any pleasurable experiences 
from going to opera performances or listening to recordings of oper-
as. She is not motivated at all to listen to Parsifal. At the same time, 
she does not think that she has any reason that is stronger, or at 
least as strong, to perform any other action that is practically incom-
patible with listening to the opera. 
 
As already mentioned in relation to Case 5, a person who 
judges that an object is aesthetically valuable, but lacks moti-
vation to acquaint herself with it because she recognizes that 
she would not get any enjoyment from doing so due to lack of 
knowledge or experience, does not need to lack in rationality. 
The additional fact that she does not think that she has any 
reason to do something else that is practically incompatible 
with this action does not appear to make any difference to her 
rationality. Furthermore, consider the following case. 
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Case 9. Cecilia thinks that Wagner’s Parsifal is aesthetically valuable. 
Indeed, from reading about the history of classical music and over-
hearing her opera loving friends talking about operas, she has come 
to think that it is one of the greatest pieces of music ever written. 
However, she is aesthetically insensitive with regard to music and 
does not get any pleasurable experiences from going to opera per-
formances or listening to recordings of operas. She is not motivated 
at all to listen to Parsifal. Moreover, Cecilia does not think that she 
has any reason that is stronger, or at least as strong, to perform any 
other action that is practically incompatible with listening to the mu-
sic. 
 
A person is aesthetically insensitive with regard to a certain 
type of objects (e.g. a certain art form), we might assume, in-
sofar as she is unable to perceive their relevant aesthetic 
properties, with the result that she does not get any aesthetic 
experience or enjoyment from acquainting herself with these 
objects. Consequently, she lacks motivation to do so. Howev-
er, lacking aesthetic sensibility in this sense is hardly a matter 
of irrationality33.  
 
7. Second normative puzzle 
Thus, we find ourselves in the same predicament as before: 
we have not found any version of Aesthetic Internalism that 
steers free from significant problem. More importantly, we 
have once again found that considerations regarding the plau-
sibility of Aesthetic Internalism give rise to a puzzle whose rel-
evance goes beyond aesthetics and has implications for the 
normative domain in general. That is: there are counterexam-
                                                            
33 Cf. Railton 1998: 72. See also McDowell 1995: 78. 
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ples to Weak Rationalist Aesthetic Internalism. At the same 
time, claims (1’)-(3’) which entail this view appear to have ini-
tial plausibility. Again, we have to give up at least one of these 
claims. As already argued, I think we should maintain claim 
(2’). There are compelling grounds to think that aesthetic rea-
sons are “real” normative reasons. We have already discussed 
claim (1’) and found that there are grounds to retain it. 
Hence, in order to preserve claims (1’) and (2’), we need to 
scrutinize (3’): Weak Normative Internalism. In spite of the fact 
that this claim might appear so weak that it hardly can be ques-
tioned, I think there are grounds to be skeptical to it. Indeed, we 
have already found one such reason: the problem of instrumen-
tal overdetermination. Return to the example above. A person 
has as an end to get to know her new neighbors. She thinks 
there are numerous means that would fulfil this end equally 
well. For each of these numerous means she thinks she has a 
reason to perform a certain action. In order to be rational, she 
needs to be motivated to perform an action that corresponds 
to at least one of these means, since it otherwise would be 
impossible for her to fulfil her end. It might be granted that 
she would not be irrational if she is motivated to perform the 
actions corresponding to each of the various means. After all, 
each such action constitutes a manner to fulfil her end. How-
ever, she would not be irrational if she is not thus motivated. 
After all, it is sufficient that she performs one of these actions 
to fulfil her end, so being motivated to perform all these ac-
tions appears redundant.  
Thus, it appears that the following scenario is possible: A 
person judges that she has a reason to perform an action but 
is not motivated to perform it even if she is fully rational. Now, 
let us return to Weak Normative Internalism. It does not mat-
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ter to this reasoning whether a person thinks she has a 
stronger, or equally strong, reason to perform another action 
that is practically incompatible with the action in question. To 
illustrate, return to the example. Assume that the person in 
question judges that she has a reason which corresponds to 
one of actions mentioned above. For instance, suppose she 
thinks she has a reason to invite her neighbors for coffee. 
Now, assume that she does not judge she has a stronger, or 
equally strong, reason to perform some other action that is 
practically inconsistent with inviting her neighbors for coffee. 
For instance, suppose she does not judge that she has a 
stronger, or equally strong, reason to visit a friend instead. It 
does not follow that she is irrational if she lacks motivation to 
invite her neighbors for coffee. It is still the case that she 
thinks there are numerous other means to fulfil her end of 
getting to know her neighbors. Hence, in order to be rational 
she does not need to have a motivation to invite them for cof-
fee even in the absence of thinking that she has another rea-
son to do something entirely different.  
The reasoning above puts us in an awkward situation. On 
the one hand, we have solved the puzzle at the beginning of 
the section in the sense that we have indications of which 
claim should be rejected: (3’), Weak Normative Internalism. As 
a consequence, we can uphold claims (1’) and (2’). In particu-
lar, we can cling to the important claim (2’) according to which 
aesthetic reasons are real normative reasons. On the other 
hand, it appears that there must be some necessary connec-
tion between normative judgments and motivation in rational 
persons. Surely, if a person judges that she has a reason to 
perform a certain action, but lacks any motivation to perform 
it, we sometimes take this as an indication of irrationality.  
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Fortunately, we already have an indication of where the so-
lution to this situation is to be sought. It seems plausible to 
submit that different normative judgments have different 
connections to rationality in virtue of concerning different 
types of reasons. In particular, if a person judges that she has a 
reason of a certain type, she is rationally required to be moti-
vated to perform it. However, if a person judges that she has a 
reason of a certain other type, she is merely rationally justified 
to be motivated to perform it. This might be described as a 
distinction between judgments about requiring reasons and 
judgments about justifying reasons34. 
 
Judgments about Rationally Requiring Reasons: necessarily, if a per-
son S judges that she has a requiring reason to perform an action, 
then she is rationally required to be motivated to perform it. 
 
Specification of the subsequent: a person S is rationally re-
quired to be motivated to perform the action insofar as (i) S is 
irrational if she lacks motivation to perform the action, and (ii) 
S is not irrational if she lacks this motivation in the absence of 
making such a judgment35. 
 
                                                            
34 For the distinction between requiring and justifying reasons, see Gert 
2004: esp. Ch. 4. For another way of drawing the distinction, see Strandberg 
forthcoming. 
35 This holds only ceteris paribus. It holds only if she does not make a further 
judgment according to which she has another requiring reason to perform 
the action. There is also a further complication. Whether a person is rational 
arguable depends both on her normative judgments and whether she is 
appropriately sensitive to facts that, if her beliefs were true, constitute 
normative reasons. See e.g. Parfit 2011: 118-25. However, this complication 
is not important in the present context. 
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Judgments about Rationally Justifying Reasons: necessarily, if a per-
son S judges that she has a justifying reason to perform an action, 
then she is rationally justified to be motivated to perform it. 
 
Specification of the subsequent: a person S is rationally justi-
fied to be motivated to perform the action insofar as (i) S is 
not irrational if she is motivated to perform the action, and (ii) 
S is irrational if she is thus motivated in the absence of making 
such a judgment36. 
In my view, there are a number of important considerations 
in favour of making this distinction in the normative domain. It 
is particularly apt in certain parts of this domain, such as morali-
ty and aesthetics37. As we shall see in the next section, I will 
suggest that aesthetic judgments are best understood as entail-
ing judgments about justifying reasons.  
However, what was said above in relation to instrumental 
overdetermination provides a very general argument indicat-
ing that the distinction is applicable throughout the normative 
domain. The person in the example above thinks there are a 
number of different means to fulfill a certain end, and she 
thinks that for each of these means there is a reason to per-
form a certain action. As we have seen, she would be irrational 
if she is not motivated to perform some of these actions, since 
she otherwise would not be able to fulfill her end. Thus, it is 
plausible to suggest that she judges that she has a reason, in 
the form of a requiring reason, to perform some of these ac-
tions. However, while she would not be irrational if she is mo-
                                                            
36 Again, this holds merely ceteris paribus. It holds only if she does not make 
a further judgment according to which she has a requiring reason or another 
justifying reason to perform the action. 
37 Most importantly, I think moral reasons constitute justifying reasons. Cf. 
Strandberg forthcoming.  
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tivated to perform each of these actions, she is not irrational if 
she is not motivated in that manner38. Thus, it seems plausible 
to suggest that she judges that she has a reason, in the form of 
a justifying reason, to perform each of these actions.  
Hence, I propose that we reject (3’), Weak Normative Inter-
nalism, and adopt the distinction above. Let us now return to 
the difficulty with regard to the normative puzzle. We have al-
ready solved the puzzle in the sense that we found which 
claim to reject: (3’). We are thus free to maintain claims (1’) 
and (2’). However, now we also have a preliminary account of 
the connection between normative judgments and motivation 
in rational persons that addresses the worry mentioned above. 
More precisely, according to this suggestion someone who 
judges she has a reason to perform an action but who is not 
motivated accordingly might be irrational, viz. in case her judg-
ment concerns a requiring reason. 
 
8. Rationalist Aesthetic Externalism  
In view of the reasoning above, it is plausible to propose that 
aesthetic judgments entail judgments about rationally justified 
reasons. The explanation is the following: there are grounds to 
adhere to claims (1’) and (2’). According to (1’), a person’s 
judgment that an object is aesthetically valuable entails that 
she has an aesthetic reason to acquaint herself with it. Accord-
ing to (2’), aesthetic reasons are real normative reasons. Con-
siderations in relation to Cases 8 and 9 indicate that a person 
might judge that an object is aesthetically valuable without be-
ing motivated to acquaint herself with it even if she is fully ra-
                                                            
38 In addition, it is plausible to suggest that, ceteris paribus, she would be 
irrational if she is motivated to perform an action without judging that she 
has any reason to perform it (but see footnotes above). 
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tional. This means that aesthetic judgments do not entail 
judgments about requiring reasons. However, aesthetic judg-
ments do entail judgments about some type of normative rea-
son according to (1’) and (2’). This line of reasoning then sug-
gests that aesthetic judgments entail judgments about justify-
ing reasons. This view entails the following claim. 
 
Rationalist Aesthetic Externalism: necessarily, if a person S judges 
that an object is aesthetically valuable, then she is rationally justified 
to be motivated to acquaint herself with it.  
 
Specification of the subsequent: a person S is rationally justi-
fied to be motivated to acquaint herself with an object insofar 
as (i) S is not irrational if she is motivated to acquaint herself 
with it, and (ii) S is irrational if she is thus motivated in the ab-
sence of making such a judgment39. 
It should be observed that this view is not an instance of 
Aesthetic Internalism on any reasonable interpretation. There 
is no necessary, non-trivial, connection between aesthetic 
judgments and motivation on this view. Especially, it is not the 
case that someone who judges that an object is aesthetically 
                                                            
39 Given the ceteris paribus condition mentioned above. Importantly, this 
view is compatible with the contention that all aesthetic reasons consist in 
requiring reasons. It says that it is conceptually necessary that a person’s 
judgment that an object is aesthetically valuable entails that she has a 
justifying reason to acquaint herself with it. However, a reason being a 
justifying reason is compatible with it also being a requiring reason. Thus, it 
might be the case that a person is rationally justified to perform a certain 
action, but that she also is rationally required to perform it. Hence, the 
judgment is compatible with the reason in question being a requiring 
reason. Moreover, what constitutes aesthetic reasons is a substantial 
matter. For instance, they might be requiring reasons because acquaintance 
with the objects in question would provide her with a certain type of 
pleasurable experience. 
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valuable needs to be motivated to acquaint herself with it in 
any non-trivial circumstances. For instance, it does not follow 
that she in any respect fails with regard to rationality were she 
to make such a judgment without being accordingly motivat-
ed. Thus, the view is an instance of the rejection of Aesthetic 
Internalism: Aesthetic Externalism.  
In spite of this, Rational Aesthetic Externalism is not incon-
sequential for our understanding of aesthetic judgments. First, 
on this view aesthetic reasons are real normative reasons ra-
ther than mere conventional reasons. Second, it means that 
there is a connection between aesthetic judgments and rea-
son in a way that makes them consonant with other value 
judgments in that such judgments entail normative reasons. 
Third, it entails a constraint on the content of aesthetic judg-
ments. It does not provide an analysis of such judgments, but 
since it constitutes a necessary condition on aesthetic judg-
ments, it comprises an essential constraint on what a correct 
analysis would need to look like. 
We are now in a position to see that Rational Aesthetic Ex-
ternalism is able to account for the various cases we consid-
ered above: Cases (1)-(9). It should be admitted that Rational 
Aesthetic Externalism is not by itself sufficient to explain the 
original case we started with: Case 2. However, it has the im-
portant advantage of being part of a plausible account of such 
scenarios. According to this account, the fact that we find it 
puzzling were someone to utter a sentence such as “Wagner’s 
Parsifal is absolutely amazing” without being motivated ac-
cordingly is to be explained in pragmatic terms. More precise-
ly, it states that there is a standardized pragmatic connection 
between utterances of a sentence to the effect that an object 
is aesthetically valuable and a positive attitude towards ac-
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quaintance with the object40. Here I am only able to describe 
the bare contours of this account. It rests on four assump-
tions. First, according to Rationalist Aesthetic Externalism a 
sentence to the effect that an object is aesthetically valuable 
entails that there is an aesthetic normative reason to get ac-
quainted with it. As noticed above, a normative reason is 
something that speaks in favour of acting in a certain manner. 
Second, it is plausible to suggest that one general purpose of 
conversations about aesthetic value is to recommend certain 
objects for aesthetic appreciation. In such conversations, we 
try to influence those we talk with to acquaint, or not ac-
quaint, themselves with certain objects. Third, a general way 
of influencing people’s actions is to let them know about our 
attitudes towards what they do. As a consequence, in order to 
understand a person who utters a sentence to the effect that 
an object is aesthetically valuable as making a contribution 
that is relevant to the purpose of the conversation, we should 
assume that she has a positive attitude towards acquaintance 
with the object in question. Fourth, it is generally presumed 
that acquaintance with objects that are aesthetically valuable 
provides with pleasurable experiences. As a consequence of 
these considerations, her utterance conversationally impli-
cates a positive attitude towards acquaintance with the ob-
ject. Moreover, since conversations about aesthetic value 
generally have the mentioned purpose, and acquaintance with 
such object generally is considered to provide enjoyment, this 
is a generalized conversational implicature. Therefore, if a per-
son utters that an object is aesthetically valuable, without be-
ing motivated to acquaint herself with it, she conversationally 
                                                            
40 For a similar account in the moral case, see Strandberg 2011a: 341-69. 
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implicates something that is difficult to make consistent with 
the purpose of the conversation and the mentioned connec-
tion to enjoyment. Consequently, we find her utterance puz-
zling41.  
Furthermore, it is plausible to argue that Rationalist Aes-
thetic Externalism is able to account for Cases 3-9. In these 
scenarios, Cecilia’s judgment that Parsifal is aesthetically valu-
able entails that she has an aesthetic reason, in the form of a 
justifying reason, to acquaint herself with it. In Case 3, she 
does not enjoy listen to the opera because she suffers from 
depression, with the consequence that she is not accordingly 
motivated. As her aesthetic judgment entails a judgment 
about a justifying reason, she is rationally justified, but not ra-
tionally required, to be motivated to listen to it. The fact that 
her aesthetic judgment entails a normative judgment means, 
however, that it is sensitive to her rational status. The fact that 
she is depressed might be an instance of irrationality which 
annuls her motivation to listen to the music she otherwise 
would have had. In Case 4, Cecilia does not enjoy listen to Par-
sifal because she has become tired of it, with the consequence 
that she is not accordingly motivated. However, she is not irra-
tional in lacking the relevant motivation, since it is a matter of 
a justifying reason rather than requiring reason. The fact that 
she does not get any enjoyment of listening to the music 
might be taken as a further indication that she does not have a 
requiring reason to do so. In Case 5, Cecilia realizes that she 
would not enjoy listening to the music because she lacks rele-
vant knowledge and experience, with the consequence that 
she is not motivated to do so. However, this is compatible with 
                                                            
41 For a related account, see Marques forthcoming. 
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her being fully rational42. In Case 8, the information was added 
that she does not judge she has a stronger, or equally strong, 
reason to do something else. This means that her aesthetic 
judgment does not entail a requiring reason to listen to Parsi-
fal. However, this is consistent with it entailing a justifying rea-
son to do so. Moreover, she does not need to be irrational in 
lacking the relevant motivation. In Case 9, Cecilia does not en-
joy listening to the music because she is aesthetically insensi-
tive, with the consequence that she is not accordingly moti-
vated. However, this is compatible with her being fully ration-
al. The further thought she has about the absence of a reason 
to perform another action does not make any difference on 
this account.  
The following objection might be directed against the ac-
count of Cases 4-9. In these scenarios, Cecilia will not get any 
enjoyment of listening to Parsifal. It may then be questioned 
why we should think that her aesthetic judgment entails that 
she has an aesthetic reason, even in the form of a justifying 
reason, to listen to the opera. There are two principal re-
sponses to this objection. First, I have argued that there are 
grounds to maintain (1’), according to which a person’s aes-
thetic judgment entails that she has a reason to acquaint her-
self with the object in question. Second, I have argued that it is 
implausible to assume that, as a matter of conceptual necessi-
ty, aesthetic reasons are provided by pleasurable experiences. 
It might be true that a person has an aesthetic reason to listen 
to Parsifal only if doing so would provide her with enjoyment, 
but this would be a substantial, not a conceptual, truth. Con-
sequently, Cecilia’s aesthetic judgment is compatible with var-
                                                            
42 As Cases 6 and 7 are quite similar to other cases, I do not comment on 
them. 
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ious views about what such a reason consists in. To mention 
two possibilities: it is compatible with the reason consisting in 
the fact that listening to Parsifal makes her having a meaning-
ful aesthetic experience which is not directly pleasurable; and 
it is compatible with the reason consisting in the fact that lis-
tening to Parsifal makes her more familiar with sophisticated 
opera music, which in turn might increase her ability to re-
ceive enjoyment from such music in the future, and so on.  
In addition, there are three further considerations which 
are worth noticing. First, since Cecilia’s aesthetic judgment en-
tails a judgment about a justifying reason, she is not irrational 
if she lacks motivation to listen to the opera. This should make 
it less problematic to maintain that her aesthetic judgment en-
tails that she has a reason to listen to it even in the absence of 
any enjoyment. Second, it should be pointed out that reasons, 
including justifying reasons, can be quite weak. This should al-
so make it less problematic to accept that Cecilia’s aesthetic 
judgment entails that she has some reason to listen to Parsifal 
also in the absence of enjoyment. Third, it should be remem-
bered that she might be mistaken: her aesthetic judgment en-
tails that she has a reason to listen to the opera, but she does 
not in fact have any such reason. The substantial view that 
aesthetic reasons are provided by a certain type of pleasurable 
experiences is a possible explanation of her mistake. 
 
9. Conclusion  
Let me summarize the main findings of our discussion. We 
have found strong grounds to doubt that there is any viable 
version of Aesthetic Internalism. There are also indications 
that Internalism is less plausible in metaaesthetics than in 
metaethics. As a result, we saw that the most plausible argu-
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ment against Aesthetic Cognitivism, and for Aesthetic Non-
Cognitivism, is mistaken, and that there are grounds to believe 
that the latter view is incorrect. Most importantly, we found 
that considerations with regard to Aesthetic Internalism give 
rise to two normative puzzles with relevance for the normative 
domain in general. The most plausible solution to these 
puzzles entails that we need to reject the common under-
standing of the connection between normative judgments and 
motivation. Moreover, it suggests that we should introduce a 
distinction between judgments about rationally requiring 
reasons and judgments about rationally justifying reasons. 
Finally, this solution also provides support to Rational Aesthe-
tic Externalism which constitutes a novel understanding of 
aesthetic judgments. 
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